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BOOK REVIEWS
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS.
By CARL KAYSEN AND DONALD F. TURNER. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959. Pp. xxiii, 345. $7.50.
Ralph F. Fuchs t
Antitrust has come a long way since the hearings, monographs, and
reports of the Temporary National Economic Committee in the late 1930's,
coinciding with the vigorous antitrust enforcement phase of the Rooseveltian
New Deal, brought together an imposing array of information and views
on the problems relating to monopoly and restraint of trade. The "new"
Sherman Act has been developed through judicial doctrines which make
of the statute a more effective set of controls over anticompetitive industrial
structure and business conduct than existed before. The patent laws, con-
strued in conjunction with the antitrust statutes, foster monopoly to a lesser
extent than previously. On the legislative side, the deficiencies of section 7
of the Clayton Act have been remedied,1 the penalty provisions of the
Sherman Act have been strengthened,2 and the applicable law of limitations
has been clarified.8 The report of the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws has brought together a far better
analysis of antitrust doctrine and policy than was available before. The
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law publishes in its semi-
annual proceedings an increasing flow of informed discussion of contem-
porary problems. Economic analysis, culminating in the recent hearings,
studies and reports of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee,4 makes
available a much more refined and precise set of diagnoses of price behavior
and its effects than existed a few years ago.
All of these developments, and the possibilities of more effective anti-
trust enforcement which grow from them, are now accompanied by a climate
of opinion in this and other countries which places less complete reliance
on planning and correspondingly more reliance on competition as economic
determinants than was the case twenty-five or thirty years ago when the
socialist influence was stronger. Even in Great Britain, the traditional
t Professor of Law, Indiana University. Professor Fuchs has expressed indebted-
ness to Samuel M. Loescher of the Department of Economics, Indiana University,
for information concerning some of the economic references cited.
164 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958).
2 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2 (1958).
8 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1958).
4 See the list of hearings, study papers and reports prepared under the study of
employment, growth, and price levels, in S. REP'. No. 1043, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 145-47
(1960).
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stronghold of tolerance for private restrictions on competition, the Restric-
tive Trade Practices Act of 1956 has been implemented effectively and has
called attention to legislative provisions and enforcement devices that may
have value in this country.5
Notwithstanding these conditions favorable to a strong antitrust policy,
it cannot be said that the central problem of freeing the economy from
monopolistic private power has been solved. Relatively inflexible, "admin-
istered" prices continue in the sale of many commodities, apparently con-
tributing significantly to the gradual and general inflation which has
persisted in the face of declining prices in some areas of the economy; 6
and there is a recognizable correlation between this price inflexibility and
industrial concentration on the selling side of the markets where goods
are sold.7 If this concentration has not increased, it has certainly not
diminished; 8 yet antitrust enforcement rarely challenges it and even less
often succeeds in curtailing it.9 The heritage of the decades when mergers
were numerous and market power was built up through practices now
regarded as illegal is still with us; the strength of existing law and the
present means of enforcement are not sufficient to cope with it.
Into this situation the authors have cast their volume, the crux of which
is a concrete proposal, with which the book concludes, to supplement the
present federal antitrust laws with new legislation. The book is for the
initiated; the text surveys the whole range of antitrust issues in a relatively
small space and comments on decisions and other developments which are
assumed to be known to the reader. Its perusal is rewarding, for its treat-
ment of the subject is realistic and accurate. Its objective of formulating a
specific legislative measure that can be considered and made the basis of
action, to the extent the proposal is deemed to be sound, is admirable.
Remedies other than legislation are not likely to produce much effect at
the present juncture of affairs. The authors' bill, beside formulating a new
means of reducing market power grounded in existing industrial concentra-
tion, confirms and makes some additions to recent judicial holdings with
regard to a range of anticompetitive practices.
In their introductory first chapter, the authors identify the aims of
antitrust policy and the central problem with which they intend to deal.
Briefly put, that problem exists because "we do not believe that the law
5 See Dennison, The British Restrictice Trade Practices Act of 1956, 2 J.L. &
Ecow. 64 (1959); Rhinelander, The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 46 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1960).
6 STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON Em-
rLoYmENT, GROWTH, AND PRICE LEVELS 104-34 (Comm. Print 1959).
7Id. at 125-26. See STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTEs OR COIAwrTION? 240-54
(1948) ; Blair, Means, Thorp and Neal on Price Inflexibility, 38 REv. EoN. & STAT.
427 (1956); Hearings Before Joint Economic Committee on Employment, Growth,
and Price Levels, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2237-62 (1959) (statement of R. F. Lanzilloti).
8 KAYsEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN EcoNOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
xii (1959) (preface by Edward S. Mason).
9 The recent cases in which divestiture has been accomplished are enumerated by
the authors at 109-11, 123.
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on monopoly has reached the point of covering, or could be fairly construed
to cover, the case where monopoly power is effectively exercised, wholly
without agreed-upon courses of action, by a small group of sellers in an
oligopoly market." (p. 21. See also p. 110). In such a market, neither
the power of each large seller taken separately nor substantial identity of
conduct among them affords a reliable basis for remedial antitrust action,
despite some indications to the contrary in important court opinions. (pp.
107-09). During the past two decades antitrust enforcement has succeeded
to a notable extent in curbing certain definite exertions of market power,
such as tying arrangements, requirements contracts, collective refusals to
deal, and patent licensing restrictions; but in the absence of these practices
the disadvantage that could result from dissolving business entities or hold-
ing normal business conduct to be illegal have tipped the scales in favor of
the status quo.
The second chapter of the book presents a brief survey, amplified in
appendices, of market structures in the American economy, and is designed
to indicate the extent to which market power probably exists. According
to the criteria adopted by the authors, "structural oligopoly is the numer-
ically dominant form of market organization in manufacturing." (p. 32).
And because concentration is especially marked in the durable goods and
investment goods industries, the economic importance of this preponderance
of concentration is greater than the mere number of industries in which it
exists would indicate. Statistically less reliable indications of concentration
in the mineral industries indicate a similar condition there.10 Account is also
taken of the strategic and quantitative importance of the regulated industries
which are largely exempt from antitrust legislation.
The remedy which the authors propose for the concentration of market
power which the prevailing industrial structure indicates is the creation of a
new Industrial Reorganization Commission charged with initiating pro-
ceedings in a new Economic Court to subject the firms in industries in
which "unreasonable market power" is deemed to exist to divestiture,
divorcement, and dissolution decrees. The authors reject any absolute limit
on business size for two reasons: 1 first, business efficiency and progress are
more important than competition, and to apply such a limit might lessen
them; and second, even if it were applied to the greatest conceivable extent
such as limiting firm assets to twenty-five million dollars, only about 10,000
firms would be added to the 3.6 million firms in the unregulated sector of
the economy and the Jeffersonian purpose of promoting a society of small
proprietorships, which might supply an alternative reason for such a policy,
would not be appreciably advanced.
10 Compare Professor Louis B. Schwartz' proposal to limit initial expansion of
antitrust legislation to "basic" industries. Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control
of Oligopoly, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 31, 47 (1960).
11 But note that Professor Schwartz advocates a figure of one billion dollars as
one of the standards which would subject a firm to close regulation or dissolution.
Id. at 47.
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To identify those industries in which market power should be reduced
by, in effect, reorganization decrees, the authors propose a statutory test
which combines structural and performance elements. The performance
element is the basic one, for market power is defined as "the persistent
ability of a person, or of a group of persons whether or not acting pursuant
to agreement or conspiracy, to restrict output or determine prices without
losing a substantial share of the market, or without losing substantial profits
or incurring heavier losses, because of the increased output or lower prices
of rivals." (p. 266). Market power is evidenced, but not exclusively, by
(1) persistent failure of prices to reflect substantial declines of demand or
costs, or to reflect substantial excess capacity; (2) persistence of profits
that are abnormally high, taking into account such factors as risks and
excess capacity; or (3) failure of new rivals to enter the market during
prolonged periods of abnormally high profits or of persistent or recurrent
rationing. The structural element is added to the definition by a conclusive
presumption that market power exists "where, for 5 years or more, one
company has accounted for 50 percent or more of annual sales in the
market, or four or fewer companies have accounted for 80 percent of sales."
(p. 267). Market power is "unreasonable" and is subject to a remedial
decree unless the defendants show it "to have been created and maintained,
entirely or almost entirely," by economies "dependent upon size," the
ownership of valid patents, lawfully acquired and lawfully used," or by
"low prices or superior products attributable to the introduction of new
processes, product improvements or marketing methods, or to extraordinary
efficiency of a single firm in comparison with . . . other firms." (p. 268).
Limitations of space forbid even an approach to adequate discussion of
this proposal. Given the prevalence of economically significant concentra-
tion in manufacturing industries under the apparently valid measures which
the authors and others 1.2 apply, and given the "administered" price behavior
and wasteful marketing methods which this concentration fosters,13 one is
led to hope for a statutory definition that would call, before performance is
to be taken into account, for remedial action in far more instances than the
authors' conclusive presumption would bring into court. The authors,
however, deem the gaps in existing knowledge to be so great "that our
conclusions about the functioning of any concrete market depend on the
joint study of both structure and performance." (p. 16). Although "the
concept of market power is basically a structural concept," (p. 75) its
identification for remedial purposes is dependent in most instances on an
examination of performance.
The trouble with this approach is illustrated by the difficulties con-
nected with the "persistence of profits that are abnormally high" as evidence
of market power. "Abnormally high" profits must be measured against a
norm; and that norm, as defined by the authors, is "the long-run supply price
of capital," indicated by "the bond-interest rate on first-grade industrial
12 BAIN, INDusTRIAL ORGANIZATION 85-265 (1959).
13 Id. at 477-602.
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bonds, plus an allowance for the extra riskiness of returns to equity capital,
appropriate to the character of the industry," or by "the historical average
returns for firms in competitive industries over long periods." (p. 63).
The "extra riskiness" of certain industries might, for example, result from
their vulnerability to cyclical fluctuations; but one supposes that many other
factors might be urged. One questions, too, whether successful firms should
be limited to the average profits of successful and unsuccessful ones in
competitive industries. When to these difficulties are added those which
the authors emphasize, of measuring the factors that may prevent market
power from being unreasonable market power, the question naturally arises
whether the proposal provides an essentially better enforcement tool than
the Sherman Act. For reasons to appear, this reviewer believes that it does,
even though a more drastic one might be defended.
An explanation of the conservative-even somewhat hesitant-nature
of the authors' proposal appears in an illuminating preface to their book
by Dean Edward S. Mason, where it is disclosed that "although this volume
has been written by the two authors whose names are appended, the study
is, in an important sense, the product" of a discussion group of lawyers and
economists at Harvard, extending over several years. (p. xix). As to the
central proposal of a market power standard, there was considerable dis-
agreement in the group, and some remained unconvinced that the standard
might not impose harmful checks on business growth by threatening the
rewards of efficiency. Others doubted that it was sufficiently clear for
effective adjudication. With such warnings confronting them, the authors'
informed judgment could hardly have been different from what it is.
Whether or not it contains an ultimate solution to the market power
problem, the Kaysen-Turner proposal embodies a distinct advance which,
in the absence of improvement through the discussion it will doubtless
arouse, seems worthy of enactment in substance. Its particular strengths
lie on the administrative side. Although the creation of a third enforcement
device consisting of a commission and a court, alongside the Federal Trade
Commission, the Department of Justice, and the federal courts, requires
considerable justification, this justification resides in the magnitude of the
task to be undertaken if existing unreasonable market power is to be at-
tacked successfully. It is too much to expect that the present agencies,
burdened with the duties they have been attempting to discharge, could
make much impression on the task, or that individual United States district
judges could summon the confidence and fortitude to dismember major
industrial enterprises which asserted sincerely and plausibly that their con-
tinuance was essential to progress and prosperity.
The authors have specific ideas for coordinating the efforts of the en-
forcement agencies that would exist if their proposal were adopted. (p.
265). One must assume, despite the historic differences between the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, that coordination is
possible and will be undertaken in good faith if a specific congressional
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directive is enacted. The proposed Economic Court would be a fully
judicial body, composed of judges assigned to it for periods sufficient to
enable them to acquire expertness without losing the character of judges.
(p. 255). Although much might be said for an administrative agency rather
than a court to determine such matters in the first instance, the judicial
device appears appropriate here, as English experience indicates.14 Objec-
tion to the "combination of prosecutor and judge" is thereby obviated, and
the prestige of the judiciary is employed in a task of major difficulty.
And the expertness required is not that of the physical scientist or of
intimate and continuing knowledge of a narrow range of affairs, such as
many of the regulatory agencies use.
If Congress and the country are seriously in favor of a policy of relying
on competition as the major device for securing the public interest in areas
of the economy which are not regulated by an administrative agency, they
should be willing to provide enough enforcement machinery for the job and
give its units manageable tasks to perform. Whether or not the statutory
language the authors propose supplies a clearer criterion for ultimate
judgment of the existence of monopoly power than the Sherman Act now
contains, something along the lines of their proposal is necessary to provide
a foundation for enforcement action. Granted that a sufficient per se rule
of illegality based on market structure is not feasible, the burden of proof
should at least be shifted from the Government to the defendants when
market power is shown to exist; such power surely justifies putting the
possessor to his proof of consistency with the public interest as legislatively
defined. Perhaps the necessity of undergoing legal scrutiny could be
imposed, without substantial harm, on concerns having a far smaller place
in the structure of a market or industry than is involved in the authors'
"conclusive presumption." 1 5
The authors rightly conclude that the criminal and treble-damage
remedies under the Sherman Act get in the way of fair and effective en-
forcement against market power or business conduct that does not result
from predatory intent or consist of violation of sharply defined prohibitions.'6
Although the fear of subsequent treble-damage recoveries against them-
enhanced by the prima facie evidence that results from a conviction or decree
on the merits in a Government action 17 -may induce defendants to plead
nolo contendere or enter into consent judgments in such actions and thereby
facilitate enforcement without trials, this advantage may be purchased at
the cost of unwise agreements in some instances.18  Certainly the implicit
14 See note 5 supra.
15 See § 2(a) (9) of the legislative proposal by Walter Adams, in Hearings Be-fore the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 2B, at 1600-25 (1949).
16 See also Professor Schwartz' contention that "the criminal and treble-damage
provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts would be inappropriate to cases of this
character involving no imputations of misbehavior or illicit monopolistic intent."
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 48.
1769 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §16 (1958).
18ATT'Y GEiN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST RFP. 360-61 (1955).
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adjudication of criminal guilt and the potentiality of large treble-damage
recoveries, which reside in a decree on the merits, tend to induce caution
in the judges in Sherman Act equity proceedings. (Cf. pp. xvi-xvii). 19
In criminal proceedings the prosecution has at times not been above resort-
ing to rather blatant appeals to jury prejudice,2 0 and the Government has
recently secured confirmation of the severe one-sidedness of the use in
civil proceedings of evidence uncovered by grand jury investigations,
which exists so long as compelling reasons to the contrary are not made to
appear.2' All told, therefore, it is sound to propose, as the authors do, that
criminal and treble-damage liability be confined to willful violations of a list
of specific infractions which they would incorporate into the Sherman Act;
that the monopolization provision of section 2 of the act be replaced by the
provision for eliminating unreasonable market power which has been de-
scribed; that the enforcement of the latter be confined to equity decrees;
and that the Industrial Reorganization Commission have subpoena powers.
(p. 265).
There is not space to discuss here the list of specific prohibitions (pp.
270-71) which the authors' proposed statutory amendments would add to
the antitrust laws. Those which go beyond consolidating judicial and
Federal Trade Commission doctrine into legislation include some interesting
prohibitions of informational exchange among competitors and the outlawry
of all price fixing by patentees in licensing agreements. As to the, latter,
there is express recognition that there could be instances in which "a price-
fixing provision would be the only effective way, short of no licensing at
all, in which a small firm patent-holder could protect its manufacturing
operations against a large rival"; but on balance the prohibition is favored.
(p. 173). Also favored is a statutory provision for five-year "petty patents"
to afford an outlet for the strong pressure for reward to the creators of
minor advances in the "arts." (p. 171). The authors also include useful
summaries of important policy problems arising in the regulated industries
(pp. 189-213) and in the relation of tax, government procurement and
property disposal, small business aid, and tariff policies to market power.
(pp. 214-33).
This book is especially commendable because it drives through to con-
clusions on all significant issues discussed, without pretense that the sup-
porting data are better than they are and with a willingness to accept the
consequences of doing the best that can be done with available information.
The purpose is to contribute to progress in the solution of important public
problems. Such a discussion is in accord with the best democratic methods
and should find more support in academic traditions than it does. Here is
political economy in a fine sense of the term. May there be more published
efforts of a similar sort; and may legislative action result.
19 Cf. Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 587 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissent of
Hastie, J.).
20 An outstanding example is discussed in the opinions in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).2 1 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
